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Comment on The Prior Convictions
Exception: Examining the Continuing
Viability of Almendarez-Torres Under
Alleyne
Kevin Flynn
I am a career prosecutor with the U.S. Department of
Justice, and I have been instructed to begin by stating that I am
submitting this comment in my personal and not my professional
capacity. My Department certainly knows the virtue of starting
off a piece with a compelling opening line.
For more than twenty-five years, I have been a violent crime
prosecutor in a city that has suffered more than its share of street
tragedy. The caseloads that I once maintained as a line attorney
and now supervise as a manager are dauntingly high: the
average misdemeanor prosecutor handles as many as 150 cases
at a time, the average felony prosecutor as many as 50 to 75, even
the average homicide prosecutor in excess of 15 or 20. The
motions practice is very high-volume but predominantly centers
on defense evidentiary challengers under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, and the subject matters can be repetitive. I would
not say that the practice on a day-to-day basis involves an array
of refined legal issues. In fact, it could probably be summed up in
two words: boilerplate responses. So I am not necessarily the best
qualified person to address the acuity of this Note’s analysis or
the rigorousness of its research. On that point, I can at least say
that, even though it has been many years since I reviewed a piece
of legal scholarship, I do know good writing when I see it, and
this is not good but excellent writing: cogent, well-phrased, wellargued across the board, and a joy to read. I never thought I
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would write the last four words of the previous sentence about a
law review article.
Having said that, if I can make a useful contribution to this
publication it is not as a sophisticated legal commentator but
rather—channeling here my inner David Foster Wallace—as an
emissary from the real world. Mine is a world where the issues
that the Note discusses have very real potential consequences for
defendants, victims, and the public servants who labor (more
than the public we serve has any idea) to achieve justice in every
case that comes before us.
Let me start by recounting an anecdote about the first time
that a significant case of mine was affected by the case, Apprendi
v. New Jersey,1 that started the movement discussed in the Note.2
Twenty-one years ago, I took to trial a defendant who had
committed a double homicide almost unimaginable in its
brutality. Following his conviction, the defendant was sentenced
to two terms of life without parole based on the aggravating
factor of the unique atrociousness of his crimes. Without
exploring the garish details, suffice it to say that the murders
were of such a nature that any reasonable person would believe it
important in a civilized society for the sentence of that defendant
to state unequivocally that he would spend the rest of his days in
jail. The atrociousness of the murders was never questioned by
the defense at trial, which simply argued before the jury that,
however horrific they were, they were committed by someone
other than the defendant. On appeal, the defendant’s convictions
were affirmed, but his sentence was ultimately reduced because
the Court of Appeals retroactively found an Apprendi violation in
that the grand jury had not been asked to consider and
specifically find in its indictment the aggravating factor of
atrociousness—notwithstanding that that matter was never
debated and was always conceded by the defense at trial. While
the defendant still received a lengthy term of incarceration at his
post-appeal resentencing, he retains the hope, albeit slight, of one
day knowing freedom again. The Note refers several times to “the
1. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
2. See Meg E. Sawyer, Note, The Prior Convictions Exception: Examining
the Continuing Viability of Almendarez-Torres Under Alleyne, 72 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 409, 410–13 (2015) (explaining Apprendi and its effect on modern
sentencing procedure).
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Apprendi Revolution.”3 To carry the metaphor one step further, it
might be said in retrospect that, in at least this case, the cause of
just and appropriate sentencing was hit by a stray
jurisprudential Molotov cocktail in that revolution.
Looking at the more narrow issue discussed in the Note, if it
is not ultimately resolved in the manner endorsed by the
author—with the survival of the prior conviction exception4—the
implications for countless criminal prosecutions in every state in
the nation would be vast. By way of example, one only has to
examine the interplay between this issue and another Supreme
Court case, Crawford v. Washington.5 Crawford held that out-ofcourt statements that are “testimonial” in nature—defined as
“made with an eye toward court”—constitute inadmissible
hearsay;6 it fundamentally changed the practices of prosecutors
across the country by, among other things, requiring them to
produce live witnesses to establish facts that heretofore could be
adduced by documentary evidence. The practical applications of
Crawford are still being sorted out. It is a live question, for
instance, whether an autopsy report in a homicide case—
scientific in nature but commonly prepared by forensic
pathologists who later testify in court about their findings—are
testimonial in nature, such that a prosecutor handling a decadesold murder case in which the original forensic pathologist has
become unavailable could be barred from admitting the report to
establish the cause and manner of the decedent’s death.
How do Crawford, Apprendi, Almendarez-Torres and Alleyne
come together here? In just this way: Were the prior conviction
exception to be eliminated, the government’s ability to prove a
defendant’s recidivist status by way of criminal history
documents would be severely hampered if not destroyed, possibly
requiring live appearances by records clerks in every case. Given
3. See id. at Introduction (introducing the Apprendi revolution).
4. See id. at Part IV (arguing the prior convictions exception is
sustainable on constitutional grounds and that overturning Almendarez-Torres
would impose severe costs on the judicial system).
5. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
6. See id. at 51 (explaining that, unless there is an opportunity for crossexamination, the Confrontation Clause bars testimonial statements, which are
“solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact” (citation omitted)).
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the fact that repeat offenders cannot be relied on to confine their
criminality to one particular county, state, or even region, it is by
no means hysterical to contemplate that the end result could be
that in a given case the government would have to transport
multiple records custodians from multiple jurisdictions simply to
establish something that can be presently (and appropriately)
proven on paper.
Now, the reader might be thinking that, if a defendant’s
constitutional rights are at issue, no amount of governmental
inconvenience is too burdensome. That is a proposition that I am
prone to agree with, and one that prosecutors in my office act on
every day. Case in point: a federal judge recently issued an
opinion in a civil case finding one of the District of Columbia’s
firearms laws unconstitutional and enjoining the city from
continuing to enforce it. The order has been stayed and the city is
considering its appeal rights, but our office has already
undertaken the laborious task of identifying pending and prior
cases that would be affected if the order prevails, and have taken
steps to change the bond conditions of certain defendants
awaiting trial on the disputed charge. I do not write about my
office’s actions in a spirit of self-congratulation—ethical
prosecutors are trained that, where a legitimate right of a
criminal defendant stands in the balance, convenience falls by the
wayside.
The key word above, of course, is legitimate. The burdens
discussed above (e.g., having to transport records clerks into a
courtroom from all over the country and lining them in the
anteroom to testify about the essentially self-evident) would be
borne by the government in the service of protecting a right that
most defendants will not choose to exercise. If there is one thing
that I have learned over a quarter century of trying criminal
cases it is this: Defendants do not want their juries to find out
bad things about them if they do not have to. The details of a
defendant’s criminal past—the exact nature of the charges of
which he has previously been convicted—are bad facts for him,
and faced with the choice of having them come out in all their
ugliness, as opposed to in sanitized form, a defendant will opt for
the latter every time. And so how will my hypothetical almost
always resolve itself? With the government spending time,
money, and resources to marshal live witnesses on the
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defendant’s recidivist record only to have his lawyer stand up in
court and say, “My client stipulates to the fact that he has X
number of felony convictions.”
In sum, as a legal treatise Meg’s Note is impressive. But it is
in its appreciation for and exploration of the practical, real-world
implications of this issue that it really shines. At the end of the
day, it demonstrates how sound legal scholarship does not exist
in a vacuum. From my perspective, when it is written in the field
in which I labor and it balances erudition and common sense, the
abstract and the concrete, it serves the public very well.

